Somerset has become Britain’s largest construction training ground. Over 26,000 workers are building the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station and the Agratas battery factory. Thousands more trained through apprenticeship programs. £17 billion invested in developing Britain’s industrial workforce.
In April 2026, when Somerset Council—the entity responsible for workforce development and skills training—could declare bankruptcy, Agratas began production. When Hinkley Point C completes construction between 2029-2031, thousands of trained construction workers will need new jobs.
The council that should retrain them won’t exist as a functioning entity.
Britain has built an infrastructure workforce development system with no plan for what happens when the projects end.
The Scale of Construction Training
Hinkley Point C operates as Britain’s largest construction training site. 12,000 workers on-site daily. Another 3,000 positions are opening in 2026.
The project has trained 1,500 apprentices—500 more than originally planned—with 70% coming from the South West region. Workers gain skills in welding, electrical work, mechanical systems, project management, and nuclear-specific construction techniques.
Over 3,600 British businesses participate in the supply chain, each developing specialized capabilities. Bridgwater’s productivity runs 10% higher than neighboring towns. The district has seen a tenfold increase in medium-sized businesses built around construction sector expertise.
The project pumped £13 billion into the British economy and £5.3 billion directly to South West suppliers—much of it funding training, skills development, and workforce capacity building.
Five miles away, Agratas builds Britain’s largest battery factory. The £4 billion facility will produce 40GWh annually—nearly half the batteries Britain’s automotive industry needs by 2030.
The facility requires 4,000 high-skilled workers. Not construction workers. Battery technicians, engineers, manufacturing specialists, and quality control experts. Different skills. Different training pathways. Different qualifications.
Construction workers who built the facility won’t automatically work there. They need retraining. Somerset Council provides retraining through further education colleges, adult skills programs, and workforce development initiatives.
Or it would—if it weren’t bankrupt.
These are the largest industrial workforce development programs in the South West since World War II. They demonstrate what Britain can build when the government commits multi-year funding to training and skills. They also demonstrate what happens when that commitment doesn’t extend to the institutions responsible for managing workforce transitions.
The Training Infrastructure Collapses
Somerset Council manages the region’s workforce development infrastructure: further education colleges, adult skills programs, apprenticeship coordination, careers services, and retraining initiatives.
It raised the council tax by 4.99% for 2026/27. It still faces a £73 million funding gap. The central government increased funding from £249 million to £252 million—a £3 million rise. 97% of the projected spending increase comes from local taxpayers, not Westminster.
Somerset Council has survived on emergency bailouts since November 2023. It plans £20 million in cuts—cuts that fall disproportionately on non-statutory services like workforce development, skills training, and adult education.
The infrastructure that should manage workforce transitions between construction and manufacturing, between project completion and new employment, between old skills and new capabilities—this infrastructure is being dismantled while the physical infrastructure rises.
North Somerset Council faces a £25.9 million gap for 2026/27. Government funding reform proposals would cut its core funding by 20%, £17.4 million less for services.
This pattern repeats nationwide. The Local Government Association projects an £8.4 billion council funding gap by 2028/29. One in six councils now requires emergency bailouts to function.
Somerset exemplifies the contradiction: multi-billion-pound infrastructure investments flourish while local government drowns in structural deficits.
The SEND Crisis
Somerset Council’s dedicated school grant deficit will exceed £100 million by March 31, 2026.
The accounting rule that keeps this deficit off the balance sheet expires the same day.
On April 1, 2026, that £100 million becomes real. Without government intervention, Somerset Council could be forced to issue a Section 114 notice. Bankruptcy. Only statutory services are funded. Everything else stops.
The Special Education Needs and Disabilities (SEND) crisis extends nationwide. Parliament’s public accounts committee estimates councils will overspend £2.9 billion to £3.9 billion annually on SEND by April 2028. Nearly half of England’s councils risk insolvency from SEND obligations alone.
The government delayed SEND reforms in October 2025—pushing implementation to 2026.
For families with disabled children, this means another year waiting for assessments that never come, support packages that arrive late, and school placements that don’t exist. For councils, it means another year of mounting deficits and impossible choices.
While Somerset Council prepares for bankruptcy, Hinkley Point C and Agratas continue construction without pause.
The Funding Divide
Hinkley Point C and Agratas receive multi-year funding commitments, cross-party political backing, and coordinated government support. These projects have national strategic importance. Their budgets don’t depend on annual begging exercises with the Treasury.
Somerset Council gets one-year settlements, emergency bailouts, and efficiency demands. It negotiates funding annually. It absorbs demographic pressures, rising service demand, and inflationary costs with no additional resources.
This is the core contradiction. Somerset builds nuclear capability for Britain’s energy security while its schools for disabled children close. The region manufactures batteries for the UK’s automotive future while its social care system collapses.
The British supply chain established through Hinkley has grown to over 4,000 firms that will support future nuclear projects like Sizewell C and small modular reactor schemes. This ecosystem received intentional government support—multi-year contracts, skills funding, and strategic coordination.
Local government receives none of this. Each council fights separately for survival. No ecosystem. No strategy. No future.
The Training Gap Nobody Planned For
Hinkley Point C targets completion between 2029-2031. When operational, the workforce drops from peak construction employment to 900 permanent operational staff.
Thousands of highly trained construction workers will need new jobs. They possess valuable skills: welding, electrical systems, mechanical assembly, project coordination, quality control, and safety management. Skills developed through years of nuclear-grade construction work.
These skills don’t directly transfer to battery manufacturing. Agratas requires different competencies: chemical engineering, battery cell assembly, quality testing protocols, manufacturing systems operation, and clean room procedures.
The gap between construction skills and manufacturing skills requires bridging programs: 6-12 month retraining courses, technical certifications, practical placements, and career transition support.
Who provides this training? Local further education colleges are funded by the Somerset Council. Adult skills programs managed by Somerset Council. Workforce development initiatives are coordinated by the Somerset Council.
Somerset Council will be bankrupt. These programs will be cut. The training infrastructure won’t exist.
Britain invested billions in training construction workers for nuclear projects with no corresponding investment in the systems that transition those workers to new roles when the projects are completed.
The Skills Mismatch
Agratas requires 4,000 workers with specialized battery manufacturing skills. Britain doesn’t have 4,000 people with these skills. The skillset barely exists in the UK.
The logical source: retrain construction workers from Hinkley Point C and Agratas’ own construction phase. Take workers with proven technical abilities, mechanical aptitude, quality standards experience, and industrial discipline. Put them through intensive retraining programs. Create Britain’s battery manufacturing workforce.
This requires: Technical colleges with equipment for battery manufacturing training. Instructors with battery technology expertise. Curriculum development for new skillsets. Certification programs industry. Placement coordination between ending projects and new roles. Financial support for workers during retraining. Career guidance and transition management.
Somerset Council coordinates all of this. Or would—if it had funding. If it weren’t cutting every non-statutory service. If workforce development weren’t being sacrificed to keep statutory services running.
Agratas opens in 2026, needing 4,000 trained workers. The training infrastructure that should produce those workers is being dismantled in 2026 to avoid bankruptcy.
April 2026
Hinkley Point C enters its final construction phase. Agratas opens for production. Construction employment peaks.
If the Somerset Council issues a Section 114 notice, bankruptcy follows. Only statutory services continue. Everything else—libraries, youth services, community programs, workforce development—stops.
The workers who built Britain’s energy infrastructure will need new jobs just as the council that should help them find work ceases to function.
The battery factory that promises Britain’s automotive future opens in a county where the local government cannot fund the education system that trains its workforce.
This is the collision.
The National Pattern
Somerset isn’t unique. One in six English councils requires emergency funding to avoid bankruptcy. Nearly half face insolvency from SEND obligations alone. The £8.4 billion local government funding gap by 2028/29 will force mass service cuts nationwide.
Meanwhile, Britain commits billions to infrastructure megaprojects with multi-year funding guarantees and political backing across parties.
The pattern is clear: Britain invests in building things. It doesn’t invest in training people.
Physical infrastructure advances. Nuclear power stations rise. Battery factories open. Supply chains develop. Industrial capability grows.
Training infrastructure collapses. Further education colleges lose funding. Adult skills programs disappear. Workforce development services are shut down. Career transition support ends. Retraining initiatives stop.
This isn’t accidental. It’s structural. The British state can commit decades of funding to nuclear construction but only one-year settlements to workforce development. It can guarantee loans for battery factories but not fund the training systems that staff them.
Somerset demonstrates what this looks like: £17 billion invested in physical infrastructure. Zero invested in sustaining the training infrastructure that develops the workforce, those facilities require.
Britain builds energy projects while dismantling the systems that train workers to build them and transition them to new roles when construction ends.
Hinkley Point C will generate electricity for 60 years. Agratas will supply half of Britain’s automotive industry. The supply chain will support future projects worth hundreds of billions.
And the 26,000 workers who built these facilities will need new jobs with no functioning training system to help them transition. The council that should coordinate workforce development will be bankrupt. The colleges that should provide retraining will have shuttered programs. The career services that should manage transitions won’t exist.
Britain trained an army of construction workers to build its energy future. It provided no system for what happens to them when that work ends.